The post is a follow-up to last week’s post regarding the recent Supreme Court decision that, among other things, arguably gave citizens a private cause of action against their local municipalities for failing to take into account their Pennsylvania constitutional rights to clean air and water. The decision also stated that fracking is clearly an industrial use and rejected the Act 13 provision that tried to force local municipalities to permit fracking in all Zoning Districts, including residential areas.
The case left open many questions, however. Must fracking be limited to industrial zones only? Can it be permitted in agricultural or commercial zones with conditions, as it is now in most places? If a local municipality wants to permit fracking in a residential area with conditions, can it? What about “spot zoning”?
In attempting to answer these question, its helpful to look to the Commonwealth Court’s earlier decision in the same case that the Supreme Court affirmed, but focused on the environmental rationale. What about the property rights of individuals in a residential area who bought their property never desiring to live in the midst of heavy industry?
What follows is an excellent analysis by the Commonwealth Court of the relationship between zoning and fracking by Judge Pellegrini in Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 52 A.3d 463. Enjoy:
While recognizing that their power to regulate zoning is only by delegation of the General Assembly, the municipalities contend that Act 13 is unconstitutional because it forces municipalities to enact zoning ordinances in conformance with 58 Pa. C.S. §3304 allowing, among other things, mining and gas operations in all zoning districts which are incompatible with the municipalities’ comprehensive plans that denominates different zoning districts, making zoning irrational. Simply put, they contend that they could not constitutionally enact a zoning ordinance if they wanted to, and it does not make an ordinance any less infirm because the General Assembly required it to be passed.
Zoning is an extension of the concept of a public nuisance which protects property owners from activities that interfere with the use and enjoyment of their property. In City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., 514 U.S. 725, 732-33, 115 S. Ct. 1776, 131 L. Ed. 2d 801 (1995), the United States Supreme Court described the purpose of zoning as follows:
Land-use restrictions designate “districts in which only compatible uses are allowed and incompatible uses are excluded.” D. Mandelker, Land Use Law § 4.16, pp. 113-114 (3d ed.1993) (hereinafter Mandelker). These restrictions typically categorize uses as single-family residential, multiple-family residential, commercial, or industrial. See, e.g., 1 E. Ziegler, Jr., Rathkopf’s The Law of Zoning and Planning § 8.01, pp. 8-2 to 8-3 (4th ed. 1995); Mandelker § 1.03, p. 4; 1 E. Yokley, Zoning Law and Practice § 7-2, p. 252 (4th ed. 1978).
Land use restrictions aim to prevent problems caused by the “pig in the parlor instead of the barnyard.” Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388, 47 S.Ct. 114, 118, 71 L.Ed. 303, 4 Ohio Law Abs. 816 (1926). In particular, reserving land for single-family residences preserves the character of neighborhoods, securing “zones where family values, youth values, and the blessings of quiet seclusion and clean air make the area a sanctuary for people.”Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9, 94 S.Ct. 1536, 1541, 39 L.Ed.2d 797 (1974); see also Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 521, 97 S.Ct. 1932, 1947, 52 L.Ed.2d 531 (1977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (purpose of East Cleveland’s single-family zoning ordinance “is the traditional one of preserving certain areas as family residential communities”).
So there is not a “pig in the parlor instead of the barnyard,” zoning classifications contained in the zoning ordinance are based on a process of planning with public input and hearings that implement a rational plan of development. The MPC requires that every municipality adopt a comprehensive plan which, among other things, includes a land use plan on how various areas of the community are to be used. Section 301 of the MPC, 53 P.S. §10301. The municipality’s zoning ordinance implements the comprehensive plan. Section 303 of the MPC, 53 P.S. §10303.
A typical zoning ordinance divides the municipality into districts in each of which uniform regulations are provided for the uses of buildings and land, the height of buildings, and the area or bulk of buildings and open spaces. See Section 605 of the MPC, 53 P.S. §10605. Permitted or prohibited uses of property and buildings are set forth for each zoning district, e.g., residential, commercial, and industrial. Use districts are often further sub-classified, for instance, into residential districts and then restricted to single-family houses and those in which multiple-family or apartment structures are permitted; commercial districts into central and local, or those in which light manufacturing is permitted or excluded; for heavy but non-nuisance types of industry; and nuisance or unrestricted districts. Height regulations fix the height to which buildings or portions thereof may be carried. Bulk regulations fix the amount or percentage of the lot which may be occupied by a building or its various parts, and the extent and location of open spaces, such as building set-backs, side yards and rear yards. Zoning ordinances segregate industrial districts from residential districts, and there is segregation of the noises and odors necessarily incident to the operation of industry from those sections in which the homes are located. Out of this process, a zoning ordinance implements a comprehensive zoning scheme; each piece of property pays, in the form of reasonable regulation of its use, for the protection that the plan gives to all property lying within the boundaries of the plan.
To determine whether a zoning ordinance is unconstitutional under Article 1, §1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution and Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, a substantive due process inquiry must take place. When making that inquiry, we take into consideration the rights of all property owners subject to the zoning and the public interests sought to be protected. Quoting from Hopewell Township Board of Supervisors v. Golla, 499 Pa. 246, 255, 452 A.2d 1337, 1341-42 (1982), our Supreme Court in In re Realen Valley Forge Greenes Assocs., 576 Pa. 115, 132, 838 A.2d 718, 728 (2003), stated that:
[t]he substantive due process inquiry, involving a balancing of landowners’ rights against the public interest sought to be protected by an exercise of the police power, must accord substantial deference to the preservation of rights of property owners, within constraints of the ancient maxim of our common law, sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas. 9 Coke 59–So use your own property as not to injure your neighbors. A property owner is obliged to utilize his property in a manner that will not harm others in the use of their property, and zoning ordinances may validly protect the interests of neighboring property owners from harm.
The Court went on to state that under that standard for zoning to be constitutional, it “must be directed toward the community as a whole, concerned with the public interest generally, and justified by a balancing of community costs and benefits. These considerations have been summarized as requiring that zoning be in conformance with a comprehensive plan for growth and development of the community.” Id. (Emphasis added).
The Commonwealth argues that Act 13 mandates that zoning regulations be rationally related to its objective: (1) optimal development of oil and gas resources in the Commonwealth consistent with the protection of the health, safety, environment and property of Pennsylvania citizens; (2) protecting the safety of personnel and facilities employed in coal mining or exploration, development, storage and production of natural gas or oil; (3) protecting the safety and property rights of persons residing in areas where mining, exploration, development, storage or production occurs; and (4) protecting the natural resources, environmental rights and values secured by the Constitution of Pennsylvania. 58 Pa. C.S. §3202.
However, the interests that justify the exercise the police power in the development of oil and gas operations and zoning are not the same. In Huntley & Huntley, Inc., 600 Pa. at 222-24, 964 A.2d at 864-66, our Supreme Court explained that while governmental interests involved in oil and gas development and in land-use control at times may overlap, the core interests in these legitimate governmental functions are quite distinct. The state’s interest in oil and gas development is centered primarily on the efficient production and utilization of the natural resources in the state. Zoning, on the other hand, is to foster the orderly development and use of land in a manner consistent with local demographic and environmental concerns. It then stated, as compared to the state interest in oil and gas exploration:
[T]he purposes of zoning controls are both broader and narrower in scope. They are narrower because they ordinarily do not relate to matters of statewide concern, but pertain only to the specific attributes and developmental objectives of the locality in question. However, they are broader in terms of subject matter, as they deal with all potential land uses and generally incorporate an overall statement of community development objectives that is not limited solely to energy development. See 53 P.S. § 10606; see also id., § 10603(b) (reflecting that, under the MPC, zoning ordinances are permitted to restrict or regulate such things as the structures built upon land and watercourses and the density of the population in different areas). See generally Tammy Hinshaw & Jaqualin Peterson, 7 Summ. Pa. Jur.2d Property § 24:12 (“A zoning ordinance reflects a legislative judgment as to how land within a municipality should be utilized and where the lines of demarcation between the several use zones should be drawn.”). More to the point, the intent underlying the Borough’s ordinance in the present case includes serving police power objectives relating to the safety and welfare of its citizens, encouraging the most appropriate use of land throughout the borough, conserving the value of property, minimizing overcrowding and traffic congestion, and providing adequate open spaces. See Ordinance § 205-2(A).
Id. at 224, 964 A.2d at 865
In this case the reasons set forth in 58 Pa. C.S. §3202 are sufficient to have the state exercise its police powers to promote the exploitation of oil and gas resources. This is the overarching purpose of Act 13 which becomes even more evident by 58 Pa. C.S. §3231 which authorizes the taking of property for oil and gas operations.
58 Pa. C.S. §3304 requires that local zoning ordinance be amended which, as Huntley & Huntley, Inc. states, involves a different exercise of police power. The public interest in zoning is in the development and use of land in a manner consistent with local demographic and environmental concerns. 58 Pa. C.S.§3304 requires zoning amendments that must be normally justified on the basis that they are in accord with the comprehensive plan, not to promote oil and gas operations that are incompatible with the uses by people who have made investment decisions regarding businesses and homes on the assurance that the zoning district would be developed in accordance with comprehensive plan and would only allow compatible uses. If the Commonwealth-proffered reasons are sufficient, then the Legislature could make similar findings requiring coal portals, tipples, washing plants, limestone and coal strip mines, steel mills, industrial chicken farms, rendering plants and fireworks plants in residential zones for a variety of police power reasons advancing those interests in their development. It would allow the proverbial “pig in the parlor instead of the barnyard.”
In this case, by requiring municipalities to violate their comprehensive plans for growth and development, 58 Pa. C.S §3304 violates substantive due process because it does not protect the interests of neighboring property owners from harm, alters the character of neighborhoods and makes irrational classifications — irrational because it requires municipalities to allow all zones, drilling operations and impoundments, gas compressor stations, storage and use of explosives in all zoning districts, and applies industrial criteria to restrictions on height of structures, screening and fencing, lighting and noise. Succinctly, 58 Pa. C.S. §3304 is a requirement that zoning ordinances be amended in violation of the basic precept that “Land-use restrictions designate districts in which only compatible uses are allowed and incompatible uses are excluded.” City of Edmonds, 514 U.S. at 732 (internal quotation omitted). If a municipality cannot constitutionally include allowing oil and gas operations, it is no more constitutional just because the Commonwealth requires that it be done.
Because the changes required by 58 Pa. C.S. §3304 do not serve the police power purpose of the local zoning ordinances, relating to consistent and compatible uses in the enumerated districts of a comprehensive zoning plan, any action by the local municipality required by the provisions of Act 13 would violate substantive due process as not in furtherance of its zoning police power. Consequently, the Commonwealth’s preliminary objections to Counts I, II and III are overruled.
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